































This paper is a reproduction of the lecture by Dr. Douglas A. Stiffler, 
who is Asoociate Professor at Juniata College. The original text was reviewed 
by himself and the revised version was translated into Japanese from Chinese 
and English by the consecutive interpreters during the lecture. Hereunder, the 
English text and the Japanese version are juxtaposed.
He had just completed the chaperoned tour of China for the students of 
Juniata College, and was visiting Japan that is one of his roots. The School of 
Contemporary International Studies, Nagoya University of Foreign Studies 
(NUFS), taking the opportunity, sponsored a special lecture on the 5th period of 
the day, 8 July 2013. Because it was still during the first semester, the students 
of the NUFS President and Dr. Kameyama Ikuo’s course “World Literature” 
and the Department of International Liberal Arts Chair and Professor Okuda 
Takao’s “Foundation of Sociology” as well as the other students/faculty and the 
general public were invited. There was a total of some 160 audience.
The title was “Globalization and East Asia: Perspectives from China, 
The Dangers of Nationalism in East Asia: 
A Personal and Historical Perspective
Douglas A. Stiffler, 
Ph.D., Associate Professor of History, Juniata College, Huntingdon, PA, U.S.A.
Tsuda Mamoru, 
Supervisor
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Russia, Japan and the United States.” The announced abstract went as follows: 
“Globalization has been widely used. However, few have approached to view 
East Asia (including Japan) from compound eyes simultaneously from China, 
Russia and the United States of America, that are all neighbors of Japan. This 
lecture intends to give a new perspective to the contemporary world.”
As stated in the lecture, Dr. Stiffler graduated from Harvard College with 
magna cum laude, and acquired a Ph.D. from the University of Calfornia. He 
majored in Russian and Chinese languages and specialized in History of Russia 
(and U.S.S.R)-China Relations, and Contemporary History of East Asia.
His great grand mother from the mother side, Clara Whitney, is known to 
be the one who spent years in Meiji Japan, and as a daughter-in-law of Katsu 
Kaishu and a wife of Kaji Umetaro had six children, but eventually went back 
to the U.S. with those children. In other words, Dr. Stiffler is a great great 
grandson of Katsu and so has roots in Japan. He is married to a Chinese lady 
and has two boys. One of the other roots from his father’s side is Germany. He 
is such an international person. He gave a talk in simple and understandable lan-
guage to the audience composed of mainly first and second year undergraduate 
students who attentively listened to it.
The consecutive interpreters for the day did the final translation from 
the revised text of the lecture in Chinese and English. The Chinese-Japanese 
interpreter-translator was Ms. Megumi Motomatu, and English-Japanese 
interpreter-translator was Mr. Jakub Marzshalenko, both doctorate students at 
NUFS graduate school.
 Tsuda Mamoru
 Professor, School of Contemporary International Studies
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　　我今天非常高 来到名古屋外国 大学作演 。　我首先要特 感 亀山
郁夫NUFS 的校 ， 代国 学部［School of Contemporary International
Studies］， 代英 学科［Department of English andContemporary
Studies］―也非常感 津田守先生！ 大家― 校的同学 ―今
天来听一个外国教授演 ！希望你 能有所收 ！




What does the future look like for you, a young Japanese man or woman, 
today? What does the future look like for a young Chinese, Filipino, Korean, 
Russian, or American? I am a historian, and while historians’ business is not 
primarily to predict the future, a historian’s business IS to try to understand 
the present, specifically – how things came to be the way they are. Today I am 
going to give you – briefly – my understanding of how we got to the present 
situation in NE Asian international relations. First, I am going to introduce a bit 
about who I am, since that in large part determines my view of things. 

I am an American college professor teaching at a small liberal arts col-
lege in the United States. I was born in 1967, grew up in rural small-town Iowa, 
and attended Harvard College in the 1980s, during the Cold War. My life and 
interests were shaped by the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. I grew up in fear of nuclear war that might end civilization, and grew 
up hearing in school and elsewhere that the United States was the greatest and 
best country in the world. And yet, I heard there was another place – the Soviet 
Union – where people thought that they were the greatest and best country in 
the world. They could not both be right! I was fascinated, and decided to study 































Russian. Later, in 1984, I had the chance to begin studying Chinese. I continued 
the study of both at Harvard, where I become an East Asian Studies major, and 
was able to study Russian and Chinese.

I am glad Prof. Ezra Vogel at Harvard made me study Japanese history 
and culture. I knew that I was part Japanese (1/8th, to be exact) and that my fam-
ily has an interesting history related to some Tokugawa and Meiji-era historical 
figures, but I was quite unsure about what this was all about. While my main 
field in graduate school at the University of California was modern Chinese 
history, I studied Japanese history and language as a secondary field, and was 
– for the first time – able to understand something of my own family history. It 
helped a great deal that my grandmother Hilda Kaji Watkins, who was born in 
Tokyo in 1896, published her own mother Clara Whitney’s diary – as Clara’s 
Diary1 – and then I began to understand the historical importance of my great-
great grandfather Katsu Kaishu. 

II.
We live in an increasingly “globalized” world, or so it seems. But does 
globalization mean integration i.e., the dropping of barriers, the ending of 
misunderstandings, the softening of hatreds? I am not so sure. The world is 
less fragmented, perhaps, for elites who can have Starbucks in Beijing in the 
morning and then Chicken Rice in Singapore in the evening, but this of course 
is not the experience of most of the world’s population. Even for the elite and 
the well-informed who travel readily from country to country in Asia, there are 
certain subjects it is better not to discuss. That often seems to include most of 
Asian history for the last century or so. My main point today: We need to get to 
know each other, and really talk to each other about our shared histories as well 
as our differing views of history. Not talking about history, not understanding 































history, is dangerous. As the saying goes: “Those who forget history are con-
demned to repeat it.” None of us would want to repeat the sufferings that our 
parents, grandparents, great grandparents, and so on, endured.

The economic and military rise of China and what will no doubt be its 
attempts to regain what its elite regards as its rightful place at the “center” of 
East Asian international relations will be the most influential international force 
in your lifetimes. And Chinese nationalism in whatever form is a critical force 
for all to understand – because many, and particularly many Japanese – failed 
to understand its importance over the last century. Each of our countries has its 
own special brand of “national exceptionalism” – the belief that our nations are 
special or better than others in some way. I know we in the US do. The Chinese 
do, and so do you. To understand Chinese nationalism, I first want to talk a bit 
about the growth of Japanese nationalism in the late 19th c., as the phenomena 
are very similar, in my view.

My great grandmother Clara Whitney had the good fortune to meet 
Fukuzawa Yukichi on a number of occasions, and she wrote about it in her 
diary. Fukuzawa, as you know, is regarded as the foremost educator in 19th-c. 
Japan, and the man who introduced Japan to the West. If you have read more 
about Fukuzawa sensei, though, you may know that he became less enthusiastic 
about the West and more enthusiastic about Japan’s own customs and “tradi-
tions” later in his life. (But what is “Japanese tradition”? What do you choose 
if there are competing alternatives, to establish a “tradition”?) In Clara’s auto-
graph album, which is in my possession, is a piece of Fukuzawa’s calligraphy 
– from 1878. It says: 文明之中不見文明。 What does this mean? For a long 
time, I was unclear about this, until I matched this calligraphy up with an entry 
in Clara’s Diary.2 One way to translate into English: “Amongst the “civilized,” 































we do not see civilization.” It is a criticism of Western “civilization” – an indi-
cation of Fukuzawa’s disillusion after his earlier enthusiasm. What caused this 
disillusion at this particular time? This was apparently an early expression of 
Fukuzawa’s disillusion with Western civilization and turn towards Japan’s own 
“traditions.”3

Fast forward some 15-20 years, to the 1890s, a time in which Katsu 
Kaishu and Fukuzawa Yukichi (d. 1901) were in the last decade of their lives. 
Fukuzawa stated in his autobiography that he stayed out of politics because he 
had little hope for the Meiji government, but by the 1890s, Japan’s economy 
and military were both becoming stronger. Remarkable “progress” had been 
made in only a few decades, and Fukuzawa was surprised and pleased by these 
developments, as many in the Japanese elite were. But Fukuzawa worried about 
the decline of native values in Japan as the process of Westernization advanced. 
Where should the Japanese look for their values in this new and unfamiliar era? 
China, I would argue, is undergoing a similar “values crisis” in the course of 
Western-style modernization today.

Fukuzawa criticized Katsu Kaishu sharply for his actions in 1868, saying 
that they contravened the Japanese “samurai spirit” – exactly the antidote the 
aging Fukuzawa felt that Japanese needed. What, according to Fukuzawa, had 
Katsu done wrong in 1868? The aging, and increasingly nationalistic, educator 
stated that Katsu should not have surrendered Edo castle to Saigo Takamori, 
but should have fought to the death. This, despite the fact that the peaceful 
surrender of Edo prevented the destruction of the city. For Fukuzawa, the nega-
tive “spiritual” consequences of 1868 had become more important than lives 
saved and destruction averted. In the 1890s, Fukuzawa was calling for a revived 
samurai spirit of “no surrender” despite the odds, and despite the human con-






























This was an ominous development, given the course of the next 50 years. 
Lesson: A spiritual crisis and extremism are one possible outcome of an over-
rapid process of industrialization and urbanization. (Does Chines nationalism 
today look at all like that of Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries? I 
think it does.) In the Hibiya Park riots in 1905, Japanese in Tokyo rioted against 
their government’s not getting enough in the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), 
which ended the Russo-Japanese war. In other words, popular nationalism was 
getting out of control, going beyond the ability of the government to defend – in 
the popular view – the national honor. Is there a similar phenomenon going on 
today with the Chinese government’s increasing assertiveness in the islands’ 
disputes – the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute between China and Japan and 
the islands’ dispute in the South China (or West Philippine) Sea involving 
multiple countries and China? Does popular nationalism threaten to grow faster 
than the Chinese government’s ability to deliver on its rhetoric? I think so.

In 1894 Japan went to war against China, and defeated the once-mighty 
and proud Qing Dynasty. Fukuzawa cheered the Japanese victory. Katsu Kaishu 
opposed the war – and I have to say I am so proud of being his descendant, 
because of this. Katsu was pragmatic and rational, and did not place his faith in 
a mythical “samurai spirit.”

About 20 years ago I got to know a senior Japanese relative, a man who 
served as an officer in the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II. When I 
asked him about the Pacific War, he told me – “You don’t understand what it 
was like at that time. We visited ports in the Pacific, and everywhere the peoples 
were under the control of Western colonialists: the British in Singapore, the 





























Dutch in Indonesia, the French in Indochina, the Americans in the Philippines. 
We (the Japanese) fought to free Asian peoples from colonial rule.” This was 
eye-opening for me. His words also echoed wartime Japanese propaganda, of 
course.

Have you heard of General Yamashita Tomoyuki? He defeated a much-
larger British force in Singapore in a brilliant lightning campaign down the 
Malay peninsula. In doing so, he dealt a severe blow to British imperialism – 
arguably, it never recovered, as the British surrendered India and other colonial 
possessions after World War II. But Yamashita, instead of being hailed as a 
hero by Tokyo after his victory, was sent to an obscure command in Manchuria. 
Yamashita had made a mistake: he told the truth. At a reception in Singapore 
on the Emperor’s birthday, he told the assembled Singapore elite that they were 
now subjects of a new Japanese Empire. Tokyo was angry, apparently, because 
wartime propaganda said that these former Western colonial possessions were 
being “liberated.” Yamashita told the truth – they were not being “liberated,” but 
were now beholden to a new colonial master.5

You may be familiar with the history of Sino-Japanese conflict. I think 
of the war between China and Japan as a 50-year struggle that began with 
the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, which Katsu opposed, and ended only 
with the Japanese surrender in August 1945. Western scholars have observed 
that Japanese scholars and politicians continually misunderstood China and 
underestimated the force of Chinese nationalism in these years. Briefly put, 
Japanese sinologists – most famously the prominent Japanese sinologist Naito 































Konan – held that China would not, and perhaps could not, change. China 
would continue to be a backward, superstitious and tradition-minded country, 
no matter what the form of government. China was incapable of change.6 To be 
fair, most Western sinologists also thought this. That meant that they missed the 
importance of the May Fourth movement of 1919, the rising nationalist enthu-
siasm of a generation of youth who were willing to sacrifice to build a strong 
China. Japanese thought this was impossible, just as Westerners looked down 
on colonized, non-white peoples, thinking them incapable of modernization and 
self-government. Big mistake!

Chinese nationalism today is an “aggrieved nationalism,” a popular 
nationalism that remembers Chinese humiliation from the Opium War of 1839-
42 to the “War to Resist Japan” from 1937-45. In fact, it is said that when Prime 
Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Japan in 1972 Mao Zedong thanked him for the 
Japanese invasion of China.7 Mao was right – the war against Japan served as 
the rallying point that spread nationalism from an educated elite to the people at 
the grassroots. So, in fact, Japanese imperialism was the midwife at the birth of 
modern Chinese nationalism.

Yes, the Chinese government does use and manipulate Chinese nation-
alism for its own purposes today. But the issue or problem is actually much 
deeper than this. Chinese nationalism is a genuine mass sentiment, especially 
among some educated younger people and can be seen on the Chinese internet/
micro-blogs, like weibo. In fact, from the Chinese government’s perspective, 
while Chinese nationalism is one of two pillars of Party rule (the other being 
economic growth), nationalism is an uncontrollable force that could get out of 
control and destabilize the government. In other words, Chinese nationalists in 
the blogosphere are likely to attack the Party for insufficient nationalist spirit, if 





























the government is not careful.

Having said this, though, there are also forces working against militant 
Chinese nationalism and the outbursts of anti-Western and anti-Japanese feel-
ing. Most important are the economic ties between China and the US, and 
China and Japan. Trade between these partners is now so huge that any serious 
disruption would potentially throw millions out of work in China – a night-
mare scenario for the Chinese government. This is why outbursts of excessive 
Chinese popular nationalism is something the Chinese government itself fears. 
The elites of all our countries have too much at stake economically to let things 
deteriorate too badly (we all hope).

But popular sentiment is important, too. And here – speaking of Chinese 
attitudes to Japanese – there are many Chinese of the younger generation who 
really like Japanese society, people, and culture. I have met them! Chinese are 
now the largest (and most money-spending) nationality of tourists travelling 
abroad. Many are travelling to Japan, and when they visit Japan, they find that 
Japanese people are warm and welcoming, and Japanese social welfare and cul-
ture very worthy of admiration. Chinese are finding that things they have been 
told or heard about Japan are simply not true. So, people-to-people contacts are 
very important. So, if you want to do something for future world peace, make a 
Chinese friend or friend from any foreign country. You will find they are people 
just like you, with hopes and dreams that are just like yours.

III.
Let me talk briefly about some of the early major countries with territory 
or interests in northeast Asia, starting with Russia. I once came upon a book 
about travels in Manchuria, written in about 1902 by an American journalist. 































The journalist noted the large Russian build-up in Manchuria along railways 
and in the ports and cities, but his main observation was that much of the 
Russian presence was government-driven or related directly to Russia’s military 
interests in the region. In contrast, he found the Chinese to be deeply rooted in 
Manchuria, enterprising, and predicted the future there belonged to the Chinese. 
This particular journalist admired the Japanese and their military potential – as 
many Americans did at the time.

Some 110 years later, it seems to me that the Russian presence in what 
used to be called the “Far East” is still primarily military and political in charac-
ter. The Russian population in East Asia is a fraction of the Chinese population, 
and will mainly export raw materials, and gas to the more developed countries 
in the region. Russia and China held naval exercises earlier this week, and 
it seems likely that the two countries will continue to cooperate to a certain 
extent to counterbalance the American presence in the region. The Chinese are 
growing more assertive in the maritime world – returning to the “blue seas” for 
the first time since Zheng He’s treasure fleet was scrapped in the 15th century. 
China’s return to the seas is a momentous development, and it is not surprising 
to see China looking for allies – here to a somewhat weak (in East Asia) and 
insecure Russia. But, having studied the tense Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian 
relationship, I think there are definite limits to cooperation in the security realm 
between Russia and China.

The two Koreas continue to be a flashpoint of conflict and a source of 
worry. We are in a transitional period with the new and untested leader Kim 
Jong-un, and North Korean politics is a “black box” and so it is hard to know 
what is really going on. Many scholars note that the North Korean leadership 
is actually quite rational, and even predictable to an extent as it uses – in the 






























international context – the “weapons of the weak” – threats, bluster, and finally 
– development of nuclear weapons, to give itself a voice in international poli-
tics. There is always the danger or the unpredictable, though: a coup? the sud-
den collapse of the regime? a mass exodus of North Korean refugees heading 
into China and into the south? All of these pose serious problems to the powers 
surrounding Korea, and all would no doubt prefer the status quo.

It is interesting to watch political developments in Japan during your 
current political campaign. It is good to limit these things to just a few weeks: 
political campaigns in the US drag on interminably, and are ridiculously expen-
sive! I find it surprising how little has changed since the 1980s in terms of war-
time or “historical issues” being a factor, and it seems to Japanese politicians 
want to have it “both ways,” in a sense. That is, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo 
makes pronouncements on historical issues now and then, but then turns around 
and says that these issues must be left to historians. It is clear he has to “walk a 
very fine line.” One aspect I find different: the LDP’s moves to open debate on 
Article 9. It seems to me that this is a direct consequence of the “rise of China” 
and no doubt a repeal or revision of Article 9 is something the US government 
would welcome. This will make for rocky relationships between Japan and its 
Asian neighbors in the future, however.

As to the United States, my country will obviously continue to be a force 
in East Asian politics in the future, but as a country with rather severe political 
and economic problems – the US will probably try increasingly to work in mul-
tilateral contexts and to rely increasingly on its Asian allies, including Japan. 
The point is not to “contain” China but to create a classic military-political 
balance-of-power between the US and its allies and China and its friends. China 
and the US continue to be deeply economically interdependent. President 






























Obama’s “pivot to Asia” should help reassure Asian-Pacific countries that the 
US will continue to play a crucial stabilizing role in the future.

IV.
What does the future hold? If the relative US economic decline is not too 
severe, the US will probably continue to be the stabilizing force in NE Asian 
relations over the coming decades. Obama’s “pivot to Asia” really is an effort 
to counter-balance China’s increasing assertiveness, especially at sea. The US 
navy, with increasing help from its Asian partners, will be active in monitoring 
– and, if necessary – countering, Chinese assertiveness. 

But it must be understood that the Chinese domestic political system 
is weak. The new President & Communist Party chief Xi Jinping is just con-
solidating his power, and scholars believe that this is at base what the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands dispute is about: Xi is trying to assert his control over the 
Chinese military and determine which generals are reliable and effective and 
which should retire. If I am right, however, and the Chinese government actu-
ally fears popular nationalism running out of its control, then the islands dispute 
will calm down. The governments of China and Japan will agree to disagree.

Beyond this, though, I sense a certain emotional or intellectual change 
amongst the Chinese elite over the past couple of years, and by “elite” I mean 
mainly well-informed students and people of the younger generation who fol-
low politics and travel abroad. They are starting to be much more skeptical 
of the Chinese Party-State, much more critical, and open about this. They are 
starting to separate the Party-state from the nation in their minds i.e. Beginning 
to say – “I can love China and also criticize the Party & Government.” In other 































words, the two are not the same, in their minds, despite all the efforts of the 
education system and media to make the Chinese Party & Government equiva-
lent to CHINA itself. For the Communist Party of China, this must be a very 
disturbing development. Something seems to be changing in a way I have not 
seen since the 1980s.8 Just how the change will proceed, nobody can say. But 
changes in people’s minds-and-hearts precede political and social change.

There are several future scenarios for China – developments which will 
impact us all. The first is that things stay pretty much as they are, with the CCP 
in charge, but with a slowing economy and increasing social problems. This 
is probably the most likely scenario. The second is that China more-or-less 
peacefully allows a “guided” multi-Party system, which many in the elite think 
is necessary to make the government more responsive to the people and curb 
rampant corruption. The third is more frightening and could grow out of either 
of the above two scenarios: China becomes socially and politically unstable, 
and becomes militantly assertive and even fascist. One does not like to believe 
this could happen, but history shows that it could.

Fortunately, countervailing forces are probably stronger. We are not 
repeating the economic protectionism and isolationism of the 1930s. We are 
now closely tied together economically. We are not in a situation of Social 
Darwinist imperialist competition, as in the late 19th century, but now have a set 
of international political and economic organizations to mediate disputes. And 
we know each other better than before, because we have been to each others’ 
countries, and we know more about each other due to the globalizing influence 
of the Internet, the blogosphere, and the media.
































So, in conclusion, I would say that the hopeful scenarios for China – and 
for us – are much more likely than the “nightmare scenarios.” The past can 
repeat itself if we do not learn from history – but we have learned, and many 
conditions are quite different than those of the early 20th century. We should 
never be complacent, though, and think that all danger is past.

What can you do? Learn about China or other foreign country. Visit there. 
Make a Chinese or other foreign friend. You will find your friend is much like 
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